Decisions in Labor, Criminal, Family Law & Justiciability Matters - Criminal Law - California Case Law
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Decisions in Labor, Criminal, Family Law & Justiciability Matters

Schofield v. Superior Court, F058298, concerned a defendants' petition for writ of mandate challenging the trial court's grant of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, in a dispute between the parties over whether a bishop continues to be incumbent Bishop of the Diocese of San Joaquin and therefore, president of the trust and president and chair of the foundation.  In granting the petition, the court vacated the trial court's judgment as plaintiff's first cause of action presents a purely ecclesiastical controversy not justiciable by civil courts.

People v. Poroj, E048123, concerned a challenge to a conviction of defendant for second degree murder, driving under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury, and driving with a blood alcohol level greater than .08 percent and causing injury, and jury's finding that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) on one of the victims in counts 2 and 3.  In affirming, the court held that section 12022.7(a) does not require a showing of intent to inflict GBI, separate or apart from the intent required to commit the felony or attempted felony for which the enhancement provision prescribes additional punishment, but rather, the only intent required to support a GBI enhancement under section 12022.7(a) is the intent required to commit the underlying felony or attempted felony.

People v. Labelle, B223468, concerned a challenge to the trial court's finding that defendant was a mentally disordered offender (MDO) in a prosecution of defendant for felony vandalism.  In affirming, the court held that a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the commitment offense met the section 2962(e)(2)(Q) criterion involving an express or implied threat of the use of force or violence.  Further, because it is reasonable to infer that a shard of glass had flown from the shattered window toward the officer's eyes, a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the commitment offense also met section 2962(e)(2)(P) criterion involving the actual use of force or violence against a human being.

In re C.B., H035085, concerned a challenge to a juvenile court's order terminating defendants' parental rights and selecting a permanent plan of adoption of their children. The court reversed for the limited purposes of providing adequate ICWA notice to the Seneca tribes and allowing the court  to reconsider, under the proper legal standard, whether the parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights applies.

Employment Dev. Dep't v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., C059062, concerned a challenge to the trial court's reversal of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board's (Board) affirmance of and ALJ's decision setting aside the assessments, in Employment Development Department's (Department) action issuing an assessment against defendant-providers of payroll services for underpaying its unemployment insurance contributions.

In affirming, the court held that, given the unity of focus on retroactivity in Unemployment Insurance Code sections 982(e) and 1127.5(d), the Legislature appears to have intended to reference the latter statute to incorporate the limitations section of 1127.5(d), not the entire statutory scheme for correct employer assessments.  The court also held that nothing in the record supports the defendant's assertion that the Legislature intended compliance with section 1127.5(a), (b), and (c) as a prerequisite to the Department's issuance of assessments against employers determined to be unified enterprises under section 135.1 and 135.2.  Lastly, the court rejected amici curiae's various challenges, including a claim that the trial court's interpretation of the statutory scheme violates defendant's due process rights and a claim that the trial court determined that the statutes were "ambiguous" and supplanted the Board's interpretation with its own.

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