The New York-based court directed the district court to delve deeper into defendant Flay Rood's criminal history to determine whether his 1991 conviction for sexual abuse of a child qualifies as a triggering offense for a mandatory minimum life sentence as a repeat sex offender.
]]> Under the federal mandatory sentencing regime for repeat sex offenders, any individual convicted of a federal sex offense who has previously been convicted of either a federal sexual offense or an equivalent state-law sexual offense is subject to a mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment.To determine whether a state offense is equivalent to a federal offense, courts must compare the elements of the state offense to the elements of the federal offense. If the state offense “consists of conduct that would [constitute] a federal sex offense” if the federal jurisdictional requirement were satisfied, the state conviction is sufficient to trigger the mandatory sentence.
The child pornography indictment to which Rood pleaded guilty included an allegation that he had been convicted in an Ohio state court of Gross Sexual Imposition. The indictment alleged that the basis of the 1991 Ohio conviction was his alleged sexual abuse of a two-year-old child. Rood pleaded guilty to the substantive charges of the child pornography indictment, and acknowledged the 1991 conviction, but he didn’t admit the underlying facts of the Ohio case.
The district court, nonetheless, sentenced Rood to the mandatory minimum term of life in prison.
Rood argued that the district court erroneously determined that the Ohio crime of Gross Sexual Imposition was a state sex offense within the meaning of the federal mandatory sentencing regime. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the district court erred in the circumstances of this case.
The Ohio statute and the federal sexual abuse statute are substantially similar, with the exception of the age cutoff: The Ohio statute criminalizes sexual contact with individuals under the age of 13, while the federal statute criminalizes such contact with individuals under the age of 12. (Thus the Ohio sexual offense could include a scenario that would not constitute a federal offense: sexual contact with an individual precisely 12 years of age.)
Accordingly, the district court could not have determined from the statutory language alone whether the offenses were equivalent; the court should have analyzed the underlying facts.
Courts are permitted few assumptions in sentencing, particularly when dealing with mandatory minimums. If you’re prosecuting a case in which the court is using a state charge to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence for a sex offender, draw the court’s attention to the necessary facts to avoid a costly appeal.
Related Resources:
How, you ask? Through the only medium more prevalent than the very air that we breathe: Starbucks Coffee.
]]> In Office Space, Jennifer Aniston's character, Joanna, must show up to her waitressing gig at Chotchkie's wearing at least 15 pieces of "flair" on her uniform. Joanna becomes frustrated when her boss tells her that she should be more like her co-worker, who sports a staggering 37 pieces of flair.Starbucks employees encountered the opposite problem: the coffee overlords at the omnipresent chain limit the pieces of pro-union flair that employees can wear on their uniforms, prompting a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) dispute.
The issue in the case is whether Starbucks can limit the number of pro-union buttons that employees could wear at any one time. The company's policy had limited it to one button less than one-inch in diameter, but an NLRB ruling said employees were not limited in the amount of union flair they chose to pin to their uniforms, reports The Consumerist.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the NLRB on Thursday, finding that the NLRB went "too far in invalidating Starbucks's one button limitation." The appellate court reasoned, "Starbucks is clearly entitled to oblige its employees to wear buttons promoting its products, and the information contained on those buttons is just as much a part of Starbucks's public image as any other aspect of its dress code. But the company is also entitled to avoid the distraction from its messages that a number of union buttons would risk."
Are pro-union buttons really that distracting? They can be. The record showed that that one employee attempted to display eight union pins on her pants, shirts, hat, and apron. (Clearly, she confused Starbucks with Chotchkie's. It happens.)
Under the National Labor Relations Act, employers may not discourage unionization by discriminating in hiring or tenure decisions. While companies should tread carefully when taking actions that could be perceived as discouraging unionization, they can restrict union flair on company uniforms.
Related Resources:
The New York-based court ruled on Thursday that the Kosher Law does not infringe upon First Amendment religious freedoms, according to Bloomberg.
The plaintiffs, Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, have sued multiple times to block New York’s kosher food laws.
]]> Commack sued in 1996 to block the law (a prior version of the Kosher Act) that imposed inspection and labeling requirements on food marketed as kosher, alleging that those statutes violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, as well as the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 2002, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the challenged portions of the law facially violated the Establishment Clause because that version of the Kosher Act required state officials to apply religious doctrine in order to determine whether the food was kosher.Following Second Circuit's decision, the New York State Legislature passed the Kosher Law Protection Act of 2004. The new Kosher Act imposed requirements on sellers and manufacturers that market their food products as "kosher" to label those foods as kosher and to identify the individuals certifying their kosher nature, but did not define kosher or authorize state inspectors to determine the kosher nature of the products.
Commack filed the current suit in 2008, challenging the constitutionality of the new Kosher Act, and alleging:
The appellate court disagreed. Second Circuit Judge Christopher Droney, who wrote the opinion, concluded, "The Kosher Act does not entangle the state with religion because it does not require the state to enforce laws based on religious doctrine or to inquire into the religious content or religious nature of the products sold."
Related Resources:
Last week, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals resuscitated a same-sex sexual harassment lawsuit on the brink of summary judgment death, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that a supervisor created a hostile work environment by touching her female subordinate's breasts three times over a five-month period.
]]> The plaintiff in the case, a parole officer, sued the New York State Division of Parole for disparate treatment on the basis of race and gender, retaliation, and sexual harassment.The district court granted the Division's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, ruling, as to the sexual harassment claim, that the alleged touchings of the plaintiff's breasts by a female Division supervisor were minor and incidental, were episodic, may have been accidental, and did not occur because of her sex.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the supervisor's touchings were sufficiently abusive to support her hostile work environment claim and that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were genuine issues of fact to be tried. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiff that summary judgment dismissing the hostile work environment claim was inappropriate.
The Supreme Court recognized same-sex sexual harassment claims for the first time in 1998, so the Second Circuit doesn't have many examples to use as a guide in what is arguably a weak sexual harassment lawsuit.
While the district court thought it critical that the plaintiff did not accuse the supervisor of making suggestive or sexual comments, the appellate court cited the Supreme Court's Oncale opinion, noting that the "factfinder, instructed to use "common sense," would be entitled to draw inferences as to intent and motivation from conduct as well as from words."
Then the opinion turned to Fifty Shades of Grey.
The court reasoned, "If the claim were that a supervisor -- of either gender -- stated to a female employee "I want to feel your breasts," or stated to a male employee "I want to feel your penis" ... a district court could not properly rule as a matter of law that that gender-specific harassment was not because of the employee's sex. It is no more permissible to rule as a matter of law that the supervisor's harassment was not because of the employee's sex when the supervisor repeatedly -- albeit silently -- touched, rubbed up against, and felt those gender-specific, intimate parts of the employee's body."
The court's summary judgment reversal comes down to interpreting the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. And, given the permissible inference that the supervisor's touchings were not accidental, the Second Circuit concluded that such repeated sexually abusive, gender-specific actions are just as offensive as words.
Related Resources:
While the Second Circuit is expected to issue its sole decision soon, we're guessing that red soles will soon make way for the appellate court to evaluate the power of the letter G in the Gucci v. Guess litigation.
What are the similarities and differences between these cases?
]]> The Louboutin-YSL dispute addresses the issue of whether Louboutin had a valid trademark on his widely-recognized red soles. Last year, Louboutin sued to enjoin competitor YSL from making red-soled shoes.In August 2011, Judge Vincent Marrero denied Louboutin's motion for a preliminary injunction to halt production of Yves Saint Laurent's (YSL) Resort 2011 all-red shoes. In his opinion, Marrero explained, "Because in the fashion industry color serves ornamental and aesthetic functions vital to robust competition, the Court finds that Louboutin is unlikely to be able to prove that its red outsole brand is entitled to trademark protection even if it has gained enough public recognition in the market to have acquired secondary meaning."
Instead of waiting for summary judgment in the case, Louboutin appealed the preliminary injunction to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Though the appellate court is expected to kick the case back to Judge Marrero for additional discovery, the decision is taking longer than initially anticipated.
The Gucci v. Guess dispute, by contrast, hasn't even made it out of the district court yet. Gucci claims that Guess and its licensees knocked off Gucci designs, producing items that featured the brand's diamond-shaped logoed pattern, square "G" design, a signature script and tri-striped motif, reports Women's Wear Daily. Gucci is asking the court to award $221 million in damages, as well as injunctive relief. At the conclusion of the trial, which ended in April, both parties appeared confidence they would prevail.
But while Louboutin argues that YSL is infringing on his trademark soles with a single shoe design, Gucci attorney Louis Ederer argued in court that Guess's "entire business model" was to copy Gucci as closely as possible without getting caught. WWD reports that Ederer told the court, "It's all an infringement ... It's all willful. It's knowing and deliberate every step of the way." Considering the tensions between the luxury house and the All-American brand, the trial court's decision, whatever it may be, will probably be appealed to the Second Circuit.
Do you think that the cases like the Louboutin-YSL dispute and the Gucci v. Guess claim are valid attempts to protect trademarks, or are the plaintiffs just trying to smother the competition?
Related Resources:
Monday, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Litwok's tax evasion convictions for the 1996 and 1997 tax years due to lack of sufficient evidence, and vacated and remanded her convictions for mail fraud and tax evasion for 1995 because the counts were improperly joined, reports The Wall Street Journal.
]]> Litwok was charged with mail fraud in connection with a false insurance claim relating to her East Hampton, N.Y., house. In addition to the evidence of mail fraud, prosecutors claimed that, from 1994 to 1997, Litwok operated a number of private equity companies from her house, including Kohn Investment I LP, which she managed through Kohn Investment Management, Inc.According to the government, Litwok routinely commingled her corporate and personal funds and used funds she received from her corporate investors to pay for personal expenses and gifts. Although they claimed that she owed nearly $1.5 million in taxes from 1995 through 1997 based on her personal income, Litwok failed to file a single personal tax return for those years.
A jury convicted Litwok on all the counts in 2010. She was sentenced to two years in prison and ordered to pay $23,551 in restitution. She served approximately one year of her sentence before the Second Circuit released her on bail pending the disposition of her appeal. (At the time, the Second Circuit noted that the parties had "agreed that the appeal presents 'a close question or one that very well could be decided the other way.'")
Clearly, the question did go the other way.
There are three required elements to prove tax evasion:
Litwok argued that, at most, the evidence indicated that she failed to file her returns, which did not satisfy the third element requiring some affirmative act.
Though the Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that failing to file a tax return does not by itself constitute an affirmative act, it concluded that there was sufficient proof that Litwok engaged in an affirmative act to evade taxes in 1995. By contrast, the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence of any such act beyond failure to file a return for the 1996 and 1997 tax year convictions.
Related Resources:
In a case involving a man from El Salvador, the New York-based appellate court also clarified that supervised release terms in the U.S. don’t magically disappear when an alien returns to his home country. (Just in case you were considering that argument.)
]]> In 2001, Natividad DeJesus Ramos was sentenced to time served and three years' supervised released for using another person's passport to enter the United States. As a condition of his supervised release, the court ordered as follows:If removed, the defendant shall not reenter the United States without the written permission of the Attorney General of the United States. Should the defendant be deported, the term of probation/supervised release shall be non-reporting while he is residing outside the United States. If the defendant reenters the United States within the term of probation/supervised release, he is to report to the nearest U.S. Probation Office within 72 hours of his arrival.
Ramos was deported to El Salvador, and reentered the U.S. approximately nine months later, still within the term of his supervised release. Ramos did not report to a probation office as required pursuant to his 2001 sentence. Ramos alleges that, at the time of his illegal reentry, he did not understand that he was on supervised release and was required to report to a probation office, since he thought his sentence terminated upon his removal to El Salvador.
Once probation authorities learned that Ramos was in the U.S. in violation of his probation, they issued a warrant. In 2009, when the warrant was still outstanding, Ramos was detained while assisting the illegal entry of aliens across the border between the United States and Canada.
A federal court sentenced Ramos principally to a term of imprisonment of 51 months pursuant to his conviction for illegally transporting aliens, 51 months for assisting an inadmissible alien in entering the United States, and 24 months for illegally being present in the United States after having previously been removed, all terms of imprisonment to run concurrently. Ramos claimed that the district court erred in adding two points to his criminal history score under Sentencing Guidelines for his commission of an offense while under a criminal justice sentence.
According to Ramos, the court erred because he was unaware he had an unexpired term of supervised release at the time he committed the present offenses.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that a defendant's knowledge that he was subject to a term of supervised release was not required for the district court to impose a sentencing enhancement.
Related Resources:
If you’re interested in serving on the Second Circuit’s Pro Bono Panel, read on.
]]> The Second Circuit's Criminal Justice Act/Pro Bono Committee is currently accepting applications for service on the Pro Bono Panel, but you don't have much time. Applications are due Friday, April 27. If this gig would be the feather in your appellate cap -- and you haven't started the application yet -- you probably need to drop everything and get to work.Pro Bono Panel members represent pro se litigants in civil appeals at the Second Circuit's invitation or on an appellant's motion for appointment of counsel. Pro bono representation is provided to litigants who the court thinks would benefit from assistance, but who would otherwise be unable to pay for counsel and are ineligible for the appointment of counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act.
Applicants must be admitted to, and members in good standing of, the Bar of the Second Circuit, (or have an application pending before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals), and have at least three years of appellate experience. Pro Bono Panel members will serve for a term not to exceed three years. Appointees from the 2009 term must submit a new application by April 27 if they wish to be considered for another term.
Pro Bono Panel applications are available on the Second Circuit's website, and must be accompanied by a resume and three writing samples. (The court prefers appellate briefs on which the attorney was the primary author.)
Completed applications and accompanying documents must be submitted no later than April 27, 2012 to:
Elizabeth Cronin, Director of Legal Affairs
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
40 Foley Square
New York, NY 10007
Friday is almost upon us; gather your writing samples, and good luck.
Related Resources:
If you’re a landlord, the denied cert is bad news.
]]> This morning, Supreme Court orders were a long list of denials, including the death knell in James and Jeanne Harmon's case challenging New York rent control laws.The State of New York adopted a rent stabilization law in 1946 to respond to the housing shortage after World War II. In 1962, the Legislature gave New York City the power to enact its own rent regulations. The city approved its rent stabilization law in 1969, and followed up with related laws in 2006 and 2009, reports Reuters.
The Harmons sued to challenge the rent stabilization policy in 2008, arguing that the law constituted a taking without just compensation, and violated the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause and the Contracts Clause of the Constitution, reports Thomson Reuters News & Insight. (The Harmons, who own and live in a small brownstone building on Manhattan's Upper West Side, claimed three tenants in their building pay government-set rents that 59 percent below market value.)
The courts were not receptive to the Harmons' claims. Both the federal district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case, referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Yee v. City of Escondido. In a summary order dismissing the case, the Second Circuit wrote, "The Supreme Court has held that governmental regulation of the rental relationship does not constitute a physical taking."
The Supreme Court was the first court that seemed willing to entertain the Harmons' case. In December, the Court asked the defendants in the case to submit briefs. SCOTUS interest in the case, however, was not enough to overcome precedent.
Are you surprised that the Supreme Court rejected the New York rent control case, or more surprised that they considered it at all?
Related Resources:
We would have been wrong.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals kicked an ERISA claim stemming from a self-electrocution incident back to an insurer for further review this week in a summary order. The court noted that, while the insurer's interpretation of the policy’s “intentionally self-inflicted injury” provision had been accepted by other federal courts in autoerotic asphyxiation cases, the insurer in the present case had not properly explained its reasons for denying the plaintiff’s claim.
]]> The plaintiff's husband died while participating in deliberate, "autoerotic activity" that involved applying "household current to his body through [a] homemade wire and switch device." She filed an ERISA claim with Hartford Life and Accident Insurance for accidental death benefits. Her claim was denied, because Hartford determined that the decedent's activities qualified as intentionally self-inflicted injuries, which fell within an exception to the ERISA plan.The plaintiff appealed. Since the ERISA plan grants Hartford "full discretion and authority to determine eligibility for benefits and to construe and interpret all terms and provisions of The Policy," the Second Circuit review was limited to abuse of discretion.
In its initial letter denying the claim, Hartford wrote that the "policy does not cover any loss which is caused or contributed to by a self-inflicted injury." Hartford claimed that when the decedent shocked himself in the course of a deliberate, "autoerotic activity," he intended to injure himself, and therefore that any resulting injury -- even a negligent injury -- fell within the policy exclusion for intentionally self-inflicted injuries.
The plaintiff countered that her husband had "engaged in similar conduct without apparent injury in the past."
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that Hartford's interpretations of the "intentionally self-inflicted injury" exclusion would exclude injuries resulting from merely negligent acts, even if the insured did not intend to inflict injury upon himself. That counts as abuse of discretion. And to the extent that Hartford later offered a different rationale for its denial after completing its administrative review, Hartford failed to provide the plaintiff with the "adequate notice ... setting forth the specific reasons for such denial" and the "full and fair review" to which she was entitled.
Here, the plaintiff prevailed on a technicality. The Second Circuit noted that while Hartford's interpretation of the policy exclusion differed from the Second Circuit approach, it could have been a permissible reading of the policy's language if the denial had properly reflected the company's reasoning.
The insurance lesson to be learned here? If you're denying accidental death benefits in an ERISA claim, make sure the denial tracks the policy language.
(Brief thanks to Above the Law for bringing "the most interesting ERISA opinion ever" to our attention.)
Related Resources:
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled this week that a conviction for witness tampering constitutes an "offense relating to obstruction of justice" for removal purposes.
]]> Albert Lloyd Higgins petitioned the Second Circuit for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying his requests for cancellation of removal and a waiver of inadmissibility. The issue in his case was whether a conviction for witness tampering under Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-151 constitutes an "offense relating to obstruction of justice" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) listing the aggravated felonies that may disqualify a petitioner from various forms of relief.Higgins, a citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1987. In 2001, Higgins was convicted of witness tampering.
The conviction originated with allegations that Higgins sexually assaulted a minor, and later told her that, if she ever talked to the police, she should tell them that "nothing ever happened." The jury acquitted Higgins of the sexual assault charge, but convicted him for witness tampering.
In 2009, an immigration judge (IJ) ordered Higgins removed to Jamaica. Both the IJ and, later, the BIA agreed that witness tampering was an offense relating to obstruction of justice, rendering Higgins ineligible for cancellation of removal and a waiver of inadmissibility.
The state law in question, CGS § 53a-151, states: A person is guilty of tampering with a witness if, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted, he induces or attempts to induce a witness to testify falsely, withhold testimony, elude legal process summoning him to testify or absent himself from any official proceeding.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, finding that the law satisfied the requisite mens rea and actus rea elements of an offense relating to obstruction of justice, dismissed Higgins' petition of review.
The courts are taking a restrictive approach in classifying what qualifies as a removable offense. If you have an immigration law client who develops a criminal record, you should prepare him for the likelihood of removability.
Related Resources:
John Terranova, Devin Baldwin, and Lamar Oliver (the Bikers) sued New York State Troopers Raphael Torres and Aaron Riley (the Troopers), claiming that the Troopers violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizure through the use of excessive force.
]]> In the incident that prompted the lawsuit, Riley received reports that motorcyclists -- presumably Nicholas Terranova, Kyle Figueroa, Baldwin, and Oliver -- were speeding and driving erratically; he enlisted Torres to help him stop the motorcyclists if they returned. After the Bikers passed Riley, Torres slowed traffic to stop them.When Baldwin was approximately 15-20 feet from Figueroa, a BMW that had been stopped in the center lane abruptly moved into the left lane, and Baldwin collided with that vehicle. Nicholas Terranova drove into the median to avoid the collision, and came to stop on the grass. Oliver, who was behind Terranova, also drove into the median and jumped off his motorcycle. Oliver's unmanned motorcycle struck Terranova in the chest, and Terranova died from the injuries.
The Bikers filed a civil rights action seeking damages for Fourth Amendment violations, claiming that they were seized without justification and that the Troopers used excessive force.
The Bikers wanted the jury instructions in the case to include a "deadly force" instruction. While the district court initially considered the idea, it ultimately instructed jurors that they were to decide whether the force used was objectively reasonable, and specified the various factors that might affect that determination. The jury ruled for the Troopers, and the Bikers appealed.
Monday, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that, absent evidence that the use of force was highly likely to have deadly effects, a jury instruction regarding justifications for the use of deadly force is inappropriate, and the usual, "objectively reasonable" instruction regarding the use of excessive force is adequate.
If you're pressing a court for a deadly force jury instruction rather than an objectively reasonable instruction, brush up on the Supreme Court's Garner v. Tennessee decision. If the use of force in your case was not "highly likely" to have deadly effects, you'll probably be stuck with the objectively reasonable standard.
Related Resources:
Aleynikov was convicted in 2010 of stealing trade secrets from his employer, Goldman Sachs, under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA). On appeal, Aleynikov argued that the Goldman Sachs source code at the center of the case was not a "stolen good" within the meaning of the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), and that it was not related to a product "produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce" within the meaning of the EEA.
]]> In February, the Second Circuit reversed Aleynikov's conviction, and ordered the district court to enter an acquittal in the case. The following day, the appellate court amended the order to remove the acquittal language, Wired reported.Second Circuit Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs, who wrote the opinion, agreed that the code was "highly valuable," but "not designed to enter or pass in commerce, or to make something that does," which means it wasn't covered by the EEA.
Furthermore, the court concluded that Aleynikov didn't violate the NSPA because he "stole purely intangible property embodied in a purely intangible format." Aleynikov transported portions of the source code to Chicago, on his own laptop and flash drive, thus his actions failed to satisfy the NSPA's tangibility requirement.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that Aleynikov should have known that his conduct breached his confidentiality obligations to Goldman, and was dishonest in ways that would subject him to sanctions, but declined to "stretch or update statutory words of plain and ordinary meaning in order to better accommodate the digital age."
Judge Guido Calabresi, however, thinks it's time for Congress to revamp the laws to cover source code theft. Calabresi wrote in a concurring opinion that he hopes "Congress will return to the issue and state, in appropriate language, what I believe they meant to make criminal in the EEA."
Related Resources:
The ruling opens the door for Peter Angelos to pursue Pfizer under Pennsylvania law for manufacturer liability. Angelos, a prominent asbestos attorney, argues that Pfizer should be held accountable for Quigley products that contained asbestos because the Pfizer logo appeared on Quigley products, reports Bloomberg.
]]> Quigley was involved in the manufacture of “refractories,” which are “materials that retain their strength at high temperatures.” From the 1930s through the 1970s, some Quigley products, including a product called “Insulag,” contained asbestos.Pfizer acquired Quigley in 1968, becoming Pfizer’s wholly-owned subsidiary. After the acquisition, various marketing materials for Quigley products, including Insulag, featured the Pfizer name, logo, and trademark. Once the hazardous effects of asbestos became widely known, more than 160,000 plaintiffs filed asbestos-related suits against Quigley. Many of these suits also named Pfizer as a defendant.
Peter Angelos started filing asbestos lawsuits against Pfizer in 1999 due to the company’s connection with Quigley. Angelos claims that Pfizer is liable as a manufacturer because it allowed its label to be put on Quigley’s asbestos-contaminated products, reports Reuters.
Quigley filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2004. The same year, the bankruptcy court granted Quigley’s motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining all of the parties from taking further action against Pfizer during Quigley’s chapter 11 case. A district court reversed the order in 2011, reports Bloomberg.
While the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not address the merits of Angelos’ asbestos lawsuit against Pfizer, the court ruled that section 524(g) of the bankruptcy code — which deals specifically with asbestos liability cases — permits Angelos to bring a class action lawsuit against Pfizer.
Related Resources:
While the underlying claim in the case may have merit, the court found that the plaintiff, Disability Advocates, Inc., lacked standing to bring the lawsuit.
]]> The question before the court was whether Disability Advocates -- a private nonprofit organization that provides services to New York State's protection and advocacy system under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI) -- had standing to sue state agencies and officials on behalf of mentally disabled adults for an alleged violation of the "integration mandate" of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and a federal grant nondiscrimination provision of the Rehabilitation Act.Disability Advocates sued the New York Coalition for Quality Assisted Living in 2003 on behalf of its "constituents," individuals with mental illness residing in adult homes in New York City. The group alleged that New York's mental health system violated the ADA integration mandate and the Rehabilitation Act, which require the provision of mental health services "in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities." The district court ruled in favor of Disability Advocates.
In 2010, District Court Judge Nicholas Garaufis ordered the state to create 1,500 housing units in New York City over three years, enabling people to leave group homes and live in homes scattered throughout the city, reports The Wall Street Journal.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned that order and dismissed the lawsuit last Friday because Disability Advocates did not satisfy the "indicia of membership" requirement for "associational standing," and the federal government's intervention in the case was not enough to cure the lack of standing.
Disability Advocates executive director Carl Zucker is contemplating refiling the claim as a class action lawsuit, according to the New York Daily News.
Related Resources: