Recently in Employment Law Category

The 1991 Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill sexual harassment claims produced sensational headlines and introduced sexual harassment into the national dialogue. The subject has now returned to the spotlight as October marks the 20th anniversary of the hearings.

While Americans became more conscious of sexual harassment claims in the wake of Justice Thomas's confirmation hearings, the first Supreme Court sexual harassment opinion, Meritor v. Vinson, was issued in 1986. In that case, the court found that sexual harassment was sex discrimination.

We're curious: Did Hill's sexual harassment claims against Justice Thomas affect his outlook in Supreme Court sexual harassment cases? Let's take a look at five of the sexual harassment claims to come before The Nine since 1991.

Will New Haven firefighters have another day in the Supreme Court?

This week, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals revived New Haven firefighter Michael Briscoe's claim challenging the same exam that the Supreme Court mulled in Ricci v. DeStefano. A district court had previously ruled that Briscoe's claim was barred by the Ricci holding.

The Nine ruled in 2009 that white New Haven firefighters were unfairly denied promotions because of their race after the city invalidated the results of a promotions exam that none of New Haven's African-American firefighters passed.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the giant retail chain today in the Walmart class action lawsuit. The sexual discrimination lawsuit was blocked from being tried as a class action as the Supreme Court delivered the news, overturning a ruling from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The gender discrimination lawsuit would have allowed 1.5 million women to proceed against the retailer as a class, potentially costing Walmart billions of dollars, reports MSNBC.

Challenge to Treasury Department Regulations

In Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsrch. v. US, No. 09-837, an action asserting that certain Treasury Department regulations, which provided that the services of a full-time employee -- which included an employee normally scheduled to work 40 hours or more per week-- were not incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study, and thus not exempt from the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, were invalid, the court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's order reversing judgment for plaintiff where the Treasury Department's full-time employee rule was a reasonable construction of 26 U.S.C. section 3121(b)(10).

Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l. Brotherhood of Teamsters, No. 08-1214, an action against a labor union by an employer, invoking federal jurisdiction under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), seeking strike-related damages for the unions' alleged breach of contract, and asking for an injunction against the ongoing strike because the hold-harmless dispute was an arbitrable grievance under the new collective bargaining agreement (CBA).  The Court affirmed in part the Ninth Circuit's partial affirmance of the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's tortious interference claims and denying defendant's separate motion to send the parties' dispute over the CBA's ratification date to arbitration, holding that the Ninth Circuit did not err in declining to recognize a new federal common-law cause of action under LMRA section 301(a) for defendant's alleged tortious interference with the CBA.  However, the Court reversed in part, holding that the parties' dispute over the CBA's ratification date was a matter for the district court, not an arbitrator, to resolve.

As the Court wrote:  "This case involves an employer's claims against a local union and the union's international parent for economic damages arising out of a 2004 strike. The claims turn in part on whether a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) containing a no-strike provision was validly formed during the strike period. The employer contends that it was, while the unions contend that it was not. Because the CBA contains an arbitration clause, we first address whether the parties' dispute over the CBA's ratification date was a matter for the District Court or an arbitrator to resolve. We conclude that it was a matter for judicial resolution. Next, we address whether the Court of Appeals erred in declining the employer's request to recognize a new federal cause of action under §301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat.156, 29 U. S. C. §185(a), for the international union's alleged tortious interference with the CBA. The Court of Appeals did not err in declining this request."

Related Resources

• Full Text of Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l. Brotherhood of Teamsters, No. 08-1214

New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457, concerned an appeal from the Seventh Circuit's denial of petitioners' petition for review of the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) finding that petitioners committed unfair labor practices.  The Court reversed, on the ground that section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act requires that a delegee group of the NLRB maintain a membership of three in order to exercise the delegated authority of the Board.

As the Court wrote:  "The Taft-Hartley Act, enacted in 1947, increased the size of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) from three members to five. See 29 U. S. C. §153(a). Concurrent with that change, the Taft-Hartley Act amended §3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to increase the quorum requirement for the Board from two members to three, and to allow the Board to delegate its authority to groups of at least three members. See §153(b). The question in this case is whether, following a delegation of the Board's powers to a three-member group, two members may continue to exercise that delegated authority once the group's (and the Board's) membership falls to two. We hold that two remaining Board members cannot exercise such authority."

Related Resources

• Full Text of New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457
• 29 U.S.C. section 153

Lewis v. Chicago, No. 08-974, concerned a Title VII action challenging Chicago's practice of selecting only applicants to firefighter positions who scored 89 or above on a written examination because of its disparate impact on African-Americans.  The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's reversal of judgment for plaintiff, holding that a plaintiff who does not file a timely charge challenging the adoption of a practice may assert a disparate impact claim in a timely charge challenging the employer's later application of that practice as long as he alleges each of the elements of a disparate impact claim.

As the Court wrote:  "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from using employment practices that cause a disparate impact on the basis of race (among other bases). 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). It also requires plaintiffs, before beginning a federal lawsuit, to file a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). §2000e-5(e)(1). We consider whether a plaintiff who does not file a timely charge challenging the adoption of a practice--here, an employer's decision to exclude employment applicants who did not achieve a certain score on an examination--may assert a disparate-impact claim in a timely charge challenging the employer's later application of that practice."

Related Resources

• Full Text of Lewis v. Chicago, No. 08-974
• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., No. 09-448, involved an action alleging that defendant violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by wrongfully denying her benefits claim.  The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's order vacating the district court's award of attorney's fees to plaintiff, holding that: 1) a fee claimant need not be a "prevailing party" to be eligible for an attorney's fees award under 29 U.S.C. section 1132(g)(1); and 2) a court may award fees and costs under section 1132(g)(1), as long as the fee claimant has achieved some degree of success on the merits.

As the Court wrote:  "1) a fee claimant need not be a "prevailing party" to be eligible for an attorney's fees award under 29 U.S.C. section 1132(g)(1); and 2) a court may award fees and costs under section 1132(g)(1), as long as the fee claimant has achieved some degree of success on the merits."

Related Resources

• Full Text of Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., No. 09-448

Conkright v. Frommert, No. 08-810, involved an ERISA action based on a plan administrator's interpretation of the benefits plan at issue to call for an approach known as the "phantom account" method.  The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's order affirming the district court's order declining to apply a deferential standard to the administrator's interpretation, on the ground that the district court should have applied a deferential standard of review to the administrator's interpretation of the plan on remand, despite the administrator's earlier mistaken interpretation.

As stated in the majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Roberts:  "People make mistakes. Even administrators of ERISA plans. That should come as no surprise, given that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is "an enormously complex and detailed statute," Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248, 262 (1993), and the plans that administrators must construe can be lengthy and complicated. (The one at issue here runs to 81 pages, with 139 sections.) We held in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U. S. 101 (1989), that an ERISA plan administrator with discretionary authority to interpret a plan is entitled to deference in exercising that discretion. The question here is whether a single honest mistake in plan interpretation justifies stripping the administrator of that deference for subsequent related interpretations of the plan. We hold that it does not."

Related Resources

• Full Text of Conkright v. Frommert, No. 08-810
• ERISA

In an arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) between a railroad and a union regarding disciplinary action against certain employees, a circuit court's order reversing the NRAB's dismissal of the arbitration for failure to conduct a pre-arbitration conference is affirmed where, by refusing to adjudicate the cases on the false premise that it lacked jurisdiction to hear them, the NRAB panel failed to conform, or confine itself, to matters Congress placed within the scope of NRAB jurisdiction.

Read Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs., No. 08-604

Appellate Information

Argued October 7, 2009

Decided December 8, 2009

Judges

Opinion by Justice Ginsburg