Last week the Third Circuit clarified an area of bankruptcy law that was unclear -- whether a disallowed trade claim in bankruptcy proceedings is also disallowable "in the hands of a subsequent transferee." The Third Circuit held that it was.
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The Third Circuit recently decided a case that now results in a circuit split with two circuits on each side of the issue. With so many circuit splits heading to the Supreme Court, this case has us wondering whether it will be one of them.
Ah, the Real Housewives of New Jersey, the guiltiest of our reality TV pleasures. Some of TV's most memorable moments came from that show. How can you forget Teresa's "prostitution whore" table-flipping incident? Or, her all-cash furniture purchases for her new, gaudy mansion? Or, her sibling
jealousy rivalry, with her sister-in-law? Need we say more?
Well, s*#t just got real for Teresa, and her husband, Joe. And since this is a Third Circuit blog, let's sit down at the federal charges table and see what the goverment is dishing up.
The U.S. Supreme Court weighed in last week on a bankruptcy issue that had come up in a 2010 Third Circuit Court of Appeals Chapter 11 ruling, and the justices didn’t see eye to eye with the Third Circuit.
The Supreme Court ruled, in a unanimous decision, that when setting out a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, debtors may not sell their property free and clear of liens without providing lienholders the opportunity to credit bid.
If you follow our numerous appellate court blogs, you’ll know that immigration appeals and deportation appeals aren’t easy to win.
A Jamaican citizen, Nigel Singh, however, had found success when the Third Circuit Court of Appeals overturned his deportation order. The Board of Immigration Appeals had ordered Singh’s deportation after he had been found guilty of bankruptcy perjury. But the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the government failed to meet its burden before the BIA.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of Medicaid this week in a lawsuit discussing a federal law preventing Pennsylvania from placing liens against the properties of living Medicaid beneficiaries, writes the Pittsburg Tribune Review.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the law doesn`t prevent the state from collecting medical costs from the money beneficiaries receive from lawsuits.
In the current economic climate, there have been many debt collection scams. Furthermore, the line between fair debt collection practices and unlawful ones has been blurred and many law firms and debt collection agencies find themselves running afoul of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
That's what happened in this Third Circuit Court of Appeals case.
The Kay Law Firm learned the hard way that fast cash isn't always the best kind of cash. The Kay Law Firm is a debt collection law firm within the Third Circuit. The law firm sent a letter to a debtor on January 11, 2009. The letter was sent to collect a debt on a Washington Mutual home equity loan.
In re: Rodriguez, 09-2724, concerned a challenge to the district court's affirmance of a Bankruptcy Court's determination that Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (Countrywide) did not have a pre-petition claim against the debtors and thus did not violate the automatic stay when it recalculated the debtors' post-petition escrow payments on their mortgage account to include certain pre-petition escrow arrears.
Rea v. Federated Investors, 10-1440, concerned a plaintiff's suit claiming that defendant violated 11 U.S.C. section 525(b) for refusing to hire him because he had previously declared bankruptcy. In affirming the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court held that the district court properly declined plaintiff's request to read the phrase "discrimination with respect to employment" in section 525(b) as broad enough to encompass discrimination in the denial of employment.
Sullivan v. DB Inv. Inc., 08-2784, concerned a challenge to the district court's certification of two putative classes and an order overruling objections to the settlement fund of $295 million in plaintiffs' suit under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and under the antitrust, consumer protection and unjust enrichment laws of all fifty states, against the De Beers corporation for fixing prices in the wholesale market for gem-quality diamonds. In vacating the decision and remanding the matter, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the settlement classes under Rule 23(b)(3) both because the indirect purchaser class as currently defined is overbroad and because the district court's certification order did not sufficiently identify those claims and issues subject to the class treatment. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the settlement class under Rule 23(b)(2).
In re Visteon Corp., 10-1944, concerned a union's challenge to the district court's order affirming a bankruptcy court's order permitting defendant-employer to terminate provision of retiree health and life insurance benefits without complying with 11 U.S.C. section 1114. In reversing the judgment, the court held that the rule of statutory construction allowing a court to ignore the plain language of a statute when literal interpretation results in absurdity is entirely inapplicable, and here, a literal interpretation of section 1114 reveals a remedial and equitable statutory scheme that, consistent with Congress' concerns when enacting the RBBPA, attempts to prevent the human dimension of terminating retiree benefits from being obscured by the business of bankruptcy.
Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 09-1587, concerned a challenge to the district court's various orders against the defendant in plaintiff's suit challenging the administrative decisions of a hearing officer and appeals panel, that the school district was not required to provide plaintiff with an IEP during the three-year compensatory period. In affirming the district court's judgment ordering the school district, for the duration of plaintiff's three years of compensatory education, to annually reevaluate plaintiff, provide her with annual IEPs, and serve as her Local Education Agency, the court held that the district court had equitable power under the IDEA to grant relief of this nature and the relief furthers the purposes of the IDEA.