Dismissal of RICO Suit Against Health Insurer is Upheld, Plus Criminal Matters
Riverview Health Inst. v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, No. 08-4431
, involved an action brought by out-of-network providers of health care services against an insurer and its officers raising claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), ERISA, and state law.
The circuit court upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs claims finding that: 1) plaintiffs' RICO claims are reverse preempted by Ohio state law, pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act; and 2) the district court did not err in denying plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint in order to add a federal estoppel claim.
In US v. Anglin, No. 08-5018
, the circuit court was again faced with a sentence for bank robbery which had been imposed following a prior remand. The circuit again reversed and remanded the matter where intervening decisions by the Supreme Court and the circuit court required re-addressing the question of whether defendant's 18 U.S.C. section 751(a) conviction should be categorized as a crime of violence for purposes of his status as a career offender. US v. Smith, No. 08-2345
, dealt with defendants' convictions arising from their involvement in a large drug conspiracy. The circuit court affirmed the convictions as: 1) the district court properly sustained an objection to a former IRS agent's tax return testimony and struck that testimony from the record, and no further response was necessary; 2) allowing agent's testimony that defendant was a "driver" for the conspiracy was not an abuse of discretion because this testimony was part of the agent's expert testimony about the structure of the cocaine conspiracy, a matter not within the ordinary knowledge of jurors; and 3) a failure to instruct the jury about the different forms of witness testimony was an error, but it was not plain error; 4) as to other defendant, evidence from a traffic stop was properly admitted because the vehicle was stopped for speeding and all extensions of the stop were supported by reasonable suspicion; 5) sufficient evidence sustained the jury verdict; and 6) any error resulting from the district court's failure to instruct the jury that "proceeds" means "profits" was not plain because the controlling opinion of the relevant Supreme Court decision expressly stated that a "profits" definition was not appropriate where the laundered money had been acquired from distributing contraband. Related Resources